East Africa’s expanding digital economy is creating new opportunities for businesses, governments and consumers, but it is also exposing financial systems to increasingly sophisticated fraud. Banking-sector statistics, police investigations and reported criminal cases across the East African Community (EAC) highlight the scale of the challenge, from unauthorized transactions and mobile-money scams to alleged bank-account breaches.
Kenya and Rwanda have reported significant financial exposure to fraud, while cases in Uganda and Tanzania illustrate the risks associated with digital payments and transfers. Reports from Burundi also raise concerns about the security of financial institutions. However, the available figures cover different types of offences and reporting periods, meaning they cannot be treated as a direct measure of cyberattacks against banks alone.
Kenya: Banking fraud exposure more than doubles
Kenya recorded a sharp increase in reported banking-sector fraud indicators in 2024, according to the Central Bank of Kenya’s Financial Sector Stability Report 2024.
The amount exposed to banking fraud rose from approximately KSh680.9 million (about US$5.25 million) in 2023 to KSh1.96 billion (about US$15.11 million) in 2024.
Actual reported losses also increased, rising from approximately KSh412.5 million (about US$3.18 million) to KSh1.59 billion (about US$12.26 million) over the same period.
The report recorded 353 banking-sector fraud cases in 2024, compared with 153 in 2023.
The distinction between exposure and actual losses is important. The amount exposed to fraud represents funds at risk or involved in reported cases; it should not automatically be interpreted as money successfully stolen. The report’s recorded actual losses provide a separate measure of the financial impact.
The increase nevertheless highlights the importance of stronger transaction monitoring, secure customer authentication, rapid fraud detection and effective coordination between banks and law-enforcement agencies.
Rwanda: Millions of dollars involved in reported fraud cases
Rwanda has also recorded financial losses associated with cyber-enabled fraud, including mobile-banking scams and attempts to manipulate financial transactions.
Figures reported by Rwanda’s National Cyber Security Authority for January to September 2019 indicated that cyber-fraud cases involved more than RWF447 million (approximately US$303,000). More than RWF166 million (approximately US$112,500) was reported recovered.
For January to September 2020, reported cyber-fraud cases involved approximately RWF371 million (about US$251,400). Authorities reported recovering approximately RWF89 million (about US$60,300), while more than RWF280 million (over US$189,800) remained unrecovered.
These figures concern reported cyber-fraud cases and should not be interpreted as losses caused exclusively by direct attacks on bank computer systems.
In September 2024, Rwanda National Police reported the arrest of 45 suspects in connection with alleged scams involving approximately RWF424 million (about US$287,300) between January and July of that year. Arrests and allegations, however, do not establish the guilt of every suspect.
Other cases illustrate the different ways financial crime can occur. In one reported incident, an attempted withdrawal involving RWF3.45 million (approximately US$2,340) was detected. A separate reported case involved an alleged plan to obtain US$700,000 from public institutions’ accounts, with the transaction reportedly intercepted before the money was stolen.
In 2026, an investigation involving Equity Bank Rwanda attracted attention over reported transaction exposure of approximately RWF4.7 billion (about US$3.19 million). That figure should be treated as reported exposure under investigation, rather than a confirmed final loss.
Another case involving an alleged US$260,189 fraud at BPR Bank Rwanda resulted in seven people facing trial in October 2026. The accused reportedly denied the charges, with judgment scheduled for December 11, 2026. The allegations therefore remain subject to the judicial process.
Taken together, the cases demonstrate why investigators and the public must distinguish between attempted fraud, intercepted transactions, suspected criminal activity, confirmed losses and money recovered.
Uganda: Alleged bank fraud involving mobile-money accounts
Uganda has also faced allegations involving the movement of money through digital financial channels.
In April 2026, Uganda Radio Network reported that eight people had been remanded in connection with an alleged UGX6 billion (approximately US$1.50 million) fraud involving Finance Trust Bank.
According to the report, the alleged transfers involved 53 MTN Mobile Money accounts and 80 Airtel Money accounts.
The case illustrates the challenges investigators face when tracing funds across bank accounts and mobile-money networks. Transfers between multiple accounts can complicate the process of identifying beneficiaries, freezing funds and establishing how a transaction was authorized.
The reported amount remains an allegation in a criminal case, not a final determination of criminal liability or a verified statement of the bank’s ultimate financial loss. The accused reportedly denied the charges.
Tanzania: Thousands of reported financial-transaction fraud offences
Tanzania’s official crime statistics provide another indication of the scale of financial fraud.
The Tanzania Police Force and National Bureau of Statistics reported 3,424 financial-transaction fraud offences in 2025, down from 4,091 in 2024, a decrease of approximately 16.3%.
The 2025 report put the amount associated with these offences at approximately TSh4.78 billion (about US$1.81 million). Approximately TSh289 million (about US$109,500) was reported recovered, and 356 suspects were arrested.
These figures cover financial-transaction fraud more broadly and should not be described as a count of cyberattacks against banks. The category can include offences that do not involve a direct breach of a financial institution’s computer systems.
Even with the reported decline in cases, the figures show that financial fraud remains a substantial concern as electronic payments become increasingly integrated into everyday economic activity.
Burundi: Report raises concerns about alleged central-bank account intrusion
A report published by Local media on September 29, 2026, alleged that unidentified individuals infiltrated accounts associated with the Central Bank of Burundi in late June 2024 and transferred funds to Poland.
The report indicated that authorities had been notified and that some funds were prevented from being withdrawn. However, a reliable, independently corroborated total for the alleged amount involved was not established in the information available for this article.
The allegation should therefore be treated cautiously. Without a confirmed amount, a detailed official account or independently corroborated findings, it would be misleading to assign a financial value to the incident or present the reported allegations as conclusively established facts.
The wider EAC picture: A connected region faces connected risks
The EAC comprises eight partner states: Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.
Their financial systems differ in scale, regulatory capacity, digital-payment adoption and the availability of published crime statistics. Comparable, decade-long data were not established for all eight countries in the research informing this article. This gap does not mean that incidents have not occurred; it means that the available evidence is insufficient to construct a consistent regional total.
The broader continental picture is also concerning. INTERPOL’s Africa Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2025 highlighted the growing threat posed by phishing, ransomware, online scams and business-email compromise. INTERPOL’s Operation Serengeti 2.0, reported in 2025, resulted in 1,209 arrests, identified nearly 88,000 victims targeted and recovered US$97.4 million. These are Africa-wide operation figures, not totals for the EAC alone.
The regional implications extend beyond individual bank accounts. Businesses increasingly depend on digital payments to pay suppliers and employees, collect revenue and deliver services. A serious security incident can interrupt operations, expose customer information and create additional costs for financial institutions and affected businesses.
The EAC’s Cross-Border Payment System Masterplan, approved in 2025, reflects the region’s drive to improve payment connectivity. Working groups were inaugurated in August 2026 as part of the continuing regional integration process. Greater interoperability can make cross-border transactions more efficient, but it also increases the importance of compatible security standards, effective fraud reporting and cooperation between regulators.
Are East Africans withdrawing money from banks on a massive scale?
Reports of financial fraud should not automatically be interpreted as evidence of widespread bank withdrawals or a regional banking crisis.
Fraud involving an unauthorized transfer, a scam that tricks a customer into sending money, a technical outage and a bank run are different events. A bank run occurs when a large number of depositors seek to withdraw their funds because they fear a bank may be unable to meet its obligations.
The cases and statistics discussed here demonstrate financial-fraud risks, but they do not establish that customers across the EAC are withdrawing deposits on a massive scale. Establishing such a trend would require separate evidence from central banks, individual financial institutions, deposit-flow statistics or other reliable reporting.
That distinction matters because unsupported claims about mass withdrawals could intensify public anxiety without accurately describing the condition of the banking system.
Closing the Gaps in East Africa’s Digital Financial Security
The reported cases point to a need for stronger safeguards across East Africa’s financial sector. Banks and mobile-money providers must improve suspicious-transaction monitoring, strengthen account verification and respond quickly to fraud alerts before money moves beyond recovery.
Cross-border cooperation will also be essential. As payments become more interconnected, financial regulators and law-enforcement agencies need to exchange information more efficiently and coordinate investigations involving transactions across national borders. Public education can complement these efforts by helping customers recognize impersonation, phishing and fraudulent requests for payment.
Another challenge is the lack of consistent data. Countries report different categories of financial crime, making regional comparisons difficult. Separating attempted fraud from confirmed losses, recovered funds and unresolved allegations would help authorities assess the scale of the problem and measure progress.
For the East African Community, the priority is to make digital financial growth more secure without undermining access or public confidence. As regional payment systems become increasingly connected, effective fraud prevention, reliable reporting and coordinated enforcement will be crucial to protecting customers and businesses.
The evidence reviewed for this article does not establish a region-wide banking crisis or mass withdrawals. It does, however, show why financial security must remain central to East Africa’s digital transformation.
